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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Rayland Brown from district cou Judgment dismissing his Petition 
for Post-Conviction Relief. He that the district court erred when it dismissed his 
petition for post-conviction relief, because the district court did not 
jurisdiction over the amended charge in the underlying criminal case. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
subject matter 
The State filed an Indictment charging Mr. Brown with forcible sexual penetration 
by use of a foreign object, felony, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-6608. (R., p.59.) On 
the second day of the trial, Mr. Brown agreed pursuant to a proposed written plea 
agreement to plead guilty to an amended charge, filed in an Information, of domestic 
battery in the presence of a child, felony, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-918(2) and 
18-918(4 ). (See R., p.59.) The district court accepted Mr. Brown's conditional guilty 
plea to the amended charge. (R., p.59.) 
At the sentencing hearing, the parties and the district court signed the proposed 
written plea agreement. (R., p.60.) The district court then imposed a unified sentence 
of twenty years, with fifteen years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., p.60.) After 
Mr. Brown participated in a "rider," the district court relinquished jurisdiction and 
executed the underlying sentence. (See R., p.60.) The district court later granted 
Mr. Brown's Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion (hereinafter Rule 35) for a reduction of 
sentence, and reduced the sentence to a unified sentence of twenty years, with eleven 
years fixed. (R., p.60.) 
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Mr. Brown filed an appeal, and the Idaho Court of Appeals, in an unpublished 
decision, affirmed the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction and its decision 
on the Rule 35 motion. (R., p.60.) 
Mr. Brown later filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.3-
14.) In the petition, Mr. Brown asserted that "his trial counsel was ineffective for the 
reason that he did not object to the sentence which was imposed." (R., p.4.) He 
asserted that the district court did not follow the plea agreement, and that trial counsel's 
failure to object to the sentence prejudiced him. (R., p.4.) In the supporting affidavit, 
Mr. Brown noted that, while the district court in the Judgment of Conviction sentenced 
him under I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-918(2) and 18-918(4 ), "according to the court record 
Petitioner violated the Idaho Code§ 18-6608." (See R., p.9.) Mr. Brown also filed a 
Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Counsel, requesting that the district 
court appoint counsel to assist him. (R., pp.21-24.) 
The district court then issued an Order Denying Motion for Appointment of 
Counsel and Notice of Intent to Dismiss Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). (R., pp.26-32.) 
The district court determined that the petition "does not state any claim that could be 
developed into viability even with the assistance of counsel, and the Court will therefore 
not appoint counsel at this time." (R., p.29.) According to the district court, "the written 
plea agreement is contained in the record, and the record conclusively rebuts the 
petitioner's contention that it was breached by the Court (or by the state) such that [trial 
counsel] had an obligation to raise that issue at sentencing or at any time prior to 
sentencing." (R., pp.29-30.) 
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The district court took judicial notice of several documents filed in Mr. Brown's 
underlying criminal case, the subject of the appeal in Supreme Court Docket No. 41488: 
the Indictment (No. 41488 R., pp.20-22), the Information (No. 41488 R., pp.60-61 ), the 
Rule 11 Plea Agreement (the written plea agreement) (No. 41488 R., pp.74-76), the 
Judgment of Conviction and Order Retaining Jurisdiction (No. 41488 R., pp.77-80), and 
the Order Relinquishing Jurisdiction and Commitment (No. 41488 R., pp.87-89). (See 
R., p.30 n.2.) 
The district court determined that "the state fulfilled its commitments by amending 
the charge as set forth in the agreement," which explained why Mr. Brown "was 
sentenced for violating a different section, or sections, of the Idaho Code than that set 
forth in the original indictment." (R., p.30 & n.3.) The State also requested a period of 
retained jurisdiction. (R., p.30.) "[T]he Court fulfilled its obligations under the plea 
agreement by retaining jurisdiction." (R., p.30.) Further, "the plea agreement explicitly 
provided that the Court would not be obligated to place the petitioner on probation 
following the retained jurisdiction period, and could instead relinquish jurisdiction." 
(R., p.30.) Thus, because there was no breach of the plea agreement by the district 
court, trial counsel "had no basis to object on that ground, and did not provide 
ineffective assistance to the petitioner as alleged." {R., p.30.) The district court 
determined that Mr. Brown's "claim is plainly frivolous, and he is not entitled to 
representation at the public expense." (R., p.30.) 
The district court also found that the petition as originally submitted "raises no 
genuine issues of material fact" and that Mr. Brown was not entitled to post-conviction 
relief. (R., p.30.) The district court accordingly granted Mr. Brown twenty days to 
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submit responsive briefing explaining specifically how the district court breached the 
plea agreement. (R., pp.30-31.) 
The State filed a Motion for Summary Disposition and Brief in Support of Motion 
for Summary Disposition, arguing that the State was entitled to summary disposition 
because Mr. Brown's ineffective assistance of counsel claims did not raise a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. 
(R., pp.33-40.) 
Mr. Brown then filed, within the twenty-day period, a Petitioner's Brief in 
Response to the Court Order Pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). (R., pp.41-57.) Mr. Brown 
asserted that trial counsel "informed him that he was going to be placed on probation" 
after completing his rider. (R., p.43.) Mr. Brown "was informed by his trial counsel ... 
that the plea agreement, included Probation." (R., p.45.) He asserted that trial 
counsel's failure to object to the sentence prejudiced him. (R., p.45.) 
The district court later issued an Order Dismissing Petition Pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906(b). (R., pp.58-65.) According to the district court, Mr. Brown's response to the 
district court's notice of intent to dismiss did not address the district court's finding that 
the ineffective assistance of counsel claim did not justify further proceedings, because 
"he provided no argument or evidence showing that the Court in fact breached the plea 
agreement." (R., pp.61-62.) "Thus, the claim as originally submitted must be 
dismissed." (R., p.62.) 
The district court further noted that Mr. Brown, in his responsive brief, "argued for 
the first time that [trial counsel] informed him that 'the plea agreement included 
Probation[.]"'. (R., p.62.) The district court determined that, even assuming trial 
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counsel had advised Mr. Brown that he should expect to be placed on probation 
following his rider, "any such misconception could not have survived the petitioner 
signing the written plea agreement filed" in the underlying criminal case. (R., p.62.) 
The plea agreement specifically provided that the district court, at the end of the period 
of retained jurisdiction, would be free to exercise or relinquish jurisdiction. (R., p.62.) 
The district court also stated that it reviewed the audio recording from Mr. Brown's 
change of plea hearing, where the district court specifically advised Mr. Brown that the 
plea agreement did not guarantee him probation. (R., p.62.) 
Thus, even assuming trial counsel had performed deficiently by advising 
Mr. Brown that the plea agreement guaranteed probation, the district court determined 
that "Mr. Brown could not (even with the assistance of counsel), show the required 
prejudice ... where he was advised to the contrary in open court ... , and when he 
signed a written Rule 11 plea agreement containing terms explicitly leaving the issue of 
probation to the discretion of this Court." (R., pp.62-63.) The district court dismissed 
the petition. (R., pp.63, 66-67.) 
Mr. Brown filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court's order dismissing 
his petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.68-71.) 
5 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Brown's petition for post-conviction relief, 
because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the amended 
charge in the underlying case? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Brown's Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief, Because The District Court Did Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over The 
Amended Charge In The Underlying Case 
Introduction 
Mr. Brown that the district court erred when it dismissed his petition for 
post-conviction relief, because the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction 
over the amended charge in the underlying criminal case. The State filed an amended 
charge in the Information, the Information alleged a different offense than that alleged in 
original Indictment, and the Information was not on a commitment by a 
magistrate following a preliminary hearing or its waiver. Thus, the Information did not 
impart subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Although Mr. Brown did not raise this argument before the district court, this 
Court may reach the question of whether the district court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over the amended charge in the underlying criminal case because "judgments and 
orders made without subject matter jurisdiction are void and are subject to collateral 
attack, and are not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit 
clause of the United States Constitution." See State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 840 (2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). "Whether a court lacks jurisdiction is a question of 
law that may be raised at any time, and over which appellate courts exercise free 
review." State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 (2004) ( citation omitted). "Whether an 
information conforms to the requirements of law is also a question subject to free 
review." Id. 
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The District Court Did Not Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over The Amended 
Charge In The Underlying Criminal Case 
that district court 
the amended charge in the underlying criminal 
not SU matter jurisdiction over 
because the Information alleged a 
offense than that alleged in the original Indictment and the Information was not 
on a commitment by a magistrate following a preliminary hearing or its waiver. 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general type 
or class of dispute." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145 (2007). "Subject matter 
jurisdiction in a criminal case is conferred by the filing of an 'information, indictment, or 
complaint alleging an offense was committed with the State of Idaho." Jones, 140 Idaho 
757-58 (internal quotation marks omitted). "Since the indictment or information 
provides subject matter jurisdiction to the court, the court's jurisdictional power depends 
on the charging document being legally sufficient to survive challenge." Id. at 758. To 
be legally sufficient, a charging document must be both legally sufficient "for the 
purpose of due process during proceedings in the trial court," and legally sufficient "for 
the purpose of imparting jurisdiction." Id. 
The Idaho Constitution provides that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for any 
felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand 
jury or on information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate .... " 
Idaho Const. Art. I, § 8. "Because a felony can only be prosecuted by an indictment 
found by a grand jury or by an information based upon the commitment of a magistrate 
(following a preliminary hearing or its waiver), Idaho Code section 19-1420 provides, 'An 
information or indictment cannot be amended so as to charge an offense other than that 
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for which the defendant has been held to answer."' State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 526 
(2011 ). 
An information may be amended "at any time before the prosecution rests if no 
additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the defendant are 
not prejudiced." I.C.R. 7(e); see I.C § 19-1420. An information "cannot be amended so 
as to charge an offense other than that for which the defendant has been held to 
answer." I.C. § 19-1420. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "the facts alleged 
rather than the designation of the offense, control" whether it is proper to amend an 
information and order a defendant to stand trial on the amended information absent a 
preliminary hearing. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 248-49 (1990) (quoting State v. 
Mickey, 27 Idaho 626, 631 (1915)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the issue 
in this case is whether the acts comprising a violation of I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-918(2) and 
18-918(4 ), as set forth and alleged in the Information, are the same acts with which 
Mr. Brown was charged in the original Indictment alleging a violation of I.C. § 18-6608. 
See id. at 249. 
Here, the written plea agreement (as signed by the parties and the district court) 
provided that, 'The State agrees to amend the charge in Count I from Forcible Sexual 
Penetration with a Foreign Object, a violation of I.C. § 18-6608, to a charge of Domestic 
Battery in the presence of a child, a violation of I.C. § 18-903, 918(2), 918(4)." (No. 
41488 R., p.74.) The Information was therefore essentially an amended information 
from the original charging document, the Indictment. The Indictment alleged: 
That the defendant, RAYLAND BROWN (aka MICHAEL BRADFORD), on 
or about the 20th day of April, 2012, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, 
did, for the purpose of sexual gratification, or abuse, cause the penetration 
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of the vaginal opening of another person, to-wit: N.K., by an object, 
against the will of N.K. by use of force or violence. 
(No. 41488 R., p.20.) 
In contrast, the Information alleged: 
That the Defendant, RAYLAND BROWN aka MICHAEL BRADFORD, on 
or about the 20th day of April 2012, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, 
did actually, intentionally, and unlawfully touch and/or strike the person of 
Nancy Kummer against her will while in the presence of T.A., a child of the 
age of 15 years, by punching and/or striking Nancy Kummer, and by 
committing said battery, did inflict a traumatic injury upon the person of 
Nancy Kummer, to-wit: lacerations and/or bruising to her face and/or 
hands and/or ankles, and where Nancy Kummer and the Defendant are 
household members. 
(No. 41488 R., p.61.) 
Mr. Brown submits that the Information charged him with a different offense than 
that charged in the original Indictment. Thus, because the Information was not based 
upon the commitment of a magistrate following a preliminary hearing or its waiver, the 
Information did not impart subject matter jurisdiction on the district court. 
The Information charged Mr. Brown with a different offense than that charged in 
the original Indictment because the facts in the Information are different than those 
originally alleged in the Indictment. Cf. O'Neill, 118 Idaho at 249-50 (holding that the 
amended information in that case was proper because the defendant "had pied guilty to 
violating I.C. § 18-1506 upon the same facts alleged in the original Information and the 
Amended Information .... No different facts were alleged in the Amended Information") 
"[C]aus[ing] the penetration of the vaginal opening of another person," as alleged in the 
Indictment, is different from "punching and/or striking" a person, as alleged in the 
Information. (See No. 41488 R., pp.20, 61.) Further, the violation of the domestic 
battery in the presence of a child statute alleged in this case is not a lesser included 
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offense of the forcible sexual penetration with a foreign object statute. Cf. O'Neill, 118 
Idaho at 250 ("Violation of I.C. § 18-1506 is a lesser included offense when an individual 
is charged with violations of I.C. § 18-1508."). 
Idaho's appellate courts have held that, where an amended indictment charges a 
different crime than the crime charged in the original indictment, and no probable cause 
determination is made by a grand jury on the amended indictment, the amended 
indictment is a nullity and the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction. Flegel, 
151 Idaho at 530; State v. Schmierer, _ Idaho _, 2014 Opinion No. 98, at 6 
(Ct. App. 2014), petition for rev. filed (Dec. 16, 2014). Mr. Brown asserts that similarly, 
where an information charges a different crime than the crime charged in the original 
charging document, and the information is not based on a commitment by a magistrate 
following a preliminary hearing or its waiver, the information is likewise a nullity and the 
district court is without subject matter jurisdiction. An information must be "based upon 
the commitment of a magistrate (following a preliminary hearing or its waiver)." See 
Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526. Neither I.C. § 19-1420 nor I.C.R. ?(e) provides an exception 
to their ban on amendment of an information to allege a different crime. See Schmierer, 
2014 Opinion No. 98, at 6. 
The Information in this case was not based upon the commitment of a magistrate 
following a preliminary hearing or its waiver. For example, the written plea agreement 
did not contemplate returning the case to a magistrate for the issuance of a commitment 
following a preliminary hearing or its waiver. (See No. 41488 R., pp.74-76.) Similarly, 
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the Information did not indicate that it was based upon the commitment of a magistrate. 1 
(See No. 41488 R., pp.60-61.) Thus, the Information here was not based upon the 
commitment of a magistrate following a preliminary hearing or its waiver. 
Because the Information in this case alleged a different offense than that alleged 
in the original Indictment and was not based upon the commitment of a magistrate 
following a preliminary hearing or its waiver, the Information did not impart subject 
matter jurisdiction on the district court. See Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526; Schmierer, 2014 
Opinion No. 98, at 6. Thus, the district court erred when it dismissed Mr. Brown's 
petition for post-conviction relief. The order dismissing his petition should be reversed, 
and his case remanded to the district court. 
On remand, because the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction over 
the amended charge of domestic battery in the presence of a child, the district court 
should enter an order vacating Mr. Brown's judgment of conviction and sentence. See 
Schmierer, 2014 Opinion No. 98, at 6. 
1 While the district court did not take judicial notice of it, the Register of Actions in the 
underlying criminal case also does not show that a commitment was filed. (See No. 
41488 R., pp.2-6.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, Mr. Brown respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the district court's order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief and remand his 
case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 20 th day of January, 2015. 
~ /~7 ,-L .. --·-?<-
BEN P. MCGREEVY . - ~ 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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